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Continuous-variable measurement-independent-device quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-
QKD) can offer high secure key rate at metropolitan distance and remove all side channel
loopholes of detection as well. However, there is no complete experimental demonstration
of CV-MDI-QKD due to the remote distance phase-locking techniques challenge. Here,
we present a new optical scheme to overcome this difficulty and also removes the require-
ment of two identical independent lasers. Furthermore, we give an alternate but detailed
proof of the minimized key rate condition to extract the secure key rate. We anticipate
that our new scheme can be used to demonstrate the in-field CV-MDI-QKD experiment
and build the CV-MDI-QKD network with untrusted source.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows remote parties (usually referred as Alice and
Bob) to establish a string of secure key even at the presence of an eavesdropper (referred as
Eve) 1–3. Based on the laws of quantum mechanics, QKD achieves formidable task and opens a
whole new area which is under rapid development and attracting lots of attentions 4. Together
with the well-known one time pad cryptosystem 5, QKD may provide information-theoretic
security. In reality, the side-channel of the QKD system are the major security risks 6–10. Fortu-
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nately, a novel protocol named measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) 11–14 has
been presented to remove all side channel attacks of detectors. In the MDI-QKD protocol, both
Alice and Bob prepare perfect quantum states and then send them to the untrusted relay (re-
ferred as Charlie) through insecure quantum channels for Bell state measurement (BSM), the
correlation between Alice and Bob can be built through the BSM results announced by Charlie.
Together with the decoy-state theory 15, 16, the qubit-based discrete-variable (DV) MDI-QKD
has been successfully experimentally demonstrated 17–24. Meanwhile, MDI-QKD also opens
a new road to help building quantum communication network 25–28, even though, in the basic
MDI-QKD protocols 11, 12, the untrusted relay is a passive repeater which is not able to beat the
point-to-point repeater-less bound 29 (see also a review 30).
The experimental demonstration of DV-MDI-QKD has been successfully performed over
404 km optical fiber 23, while the secure key rate is relatively low even at metropolitan distance
due to the single photon encoding. Continuous variable (CV) encoding scheme can also be used
for QKD to share secret key 31–41. The Gaussian-modulated coherent states CV-QKD has been
successfully experimentally demonstrated through approximate 100 km optical fiber 42, 43 under
collective attack. Recently, the security of coherent states continuous-variable quantum key dis-
tribution against coherent attack in a realistic finite-size regime has been proved 44, which paves
the way to information-theoretically secure CV-QKD. Due to its obvious advantages of high
secure key rate, low cost and running in room-temperature, CV-QKD becomes a very active
research area in quantum information 3. Similar with the DV system, several practical attacks
about detectors are also found in CV-QKD recently 45–48. In order to be immune to all detector
loopholes and achieve high secure key rate at metropolitan distance, the CV-MDI-QKD is pro-
posed recently 49–52 with a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration performed on the free
space optical platform by sharing a highly stable laser 49. The CV-MDI-QKD has shown great
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potential for its high secret key rate and low commercial cost compared with the corresponding
DV-MDI-QKD protocol 49, 53, 54. However, a complete experimental demonstration of CV-MDI-
QKD with distances of kilometers in optical fiber or free space is still not yet realized due
to technical challenges. Thereinto, the main challenge is that remote distance phase-locking
technique is necessary to achieve correct CV BSM. However, this requirement is not needed
in DV-MDI-QKD due to the fact that the two-photon Hong-Ou-Mandel interference is phase
unrelated 55.
In this paper, we present a new optical scheme to solve the common phase-reference
problem. The central idea of this new optical scheme is that reliable phase reference can be
established by transmitting the two laser pulses quantum states through the same optical path,
such as optical fiber or free space. Compared with the previous protocol 49, a pair of Faraday
mirrors (FM) and several polarization beam splitters (PBS) are needed 56, 57. No complicated
active or passive phase-locking or compensation technology is required in this new scheme,
which greatly simplifies the experimental realization of CV-MDI-QKD. Similar structures has
already been successfully used in a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of quantum
fingerprinting beating the classical limit 58. Furthermore, we give an alternate but detailed proof
of the minimized key rate condition to extract the secure key rate, which has been used and first
proved in Ref. 49.
Results
Phase self-aligned CV-MDI-QKD. The basic idea of CV-MDI-QKD protocol is shown in
Fig. 1. It includes the following major steps 49–51: (1) Alice and Bob prepare the sequence
of Gaussian-modulated coherent states |xˆA + ipˆA〉 and |xˆB + ipˆB〉, respectively. (2) The quan-
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Figure 1: The general structure of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
tum states are transmitted through insecure quantum links to the untrusted relay for CV BSM.
(3) The incoming quantum states from two parties are coupled to interfere through a balanced
beam splitter. Two output quantum states are measured with homodyne in xˆ and pˆ quadra-
ture, with xˆ− = (xˆA − xˆB)/
√
2 and pˆ+ = (pˆA + pˆB)/
√
2. The measurements together give
γ = (xˆ−+ipˆ+)/
√
2with the probability p(γ), and the results γ are transmitted to both Alice and
Bob through the public channel. (4) Based on the measurement results, Alice or Bob confirms
the other’s state value, then correlation is built. (5) Similar with the usual CV-QKD protocol,
through error correction and privacy amplification, a secure key is acquired.
Fig. 2 shows the detailed structure of our new scheme with optical fiber. The laser pulse
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goes through a polarization maintaining fiber PBS (PMF-PBS) to filter out its horizonal (H)
polarized component. Then after a polarization maintaining optical circulator, the laser pulse
directly goes through a balanced PMF beam splitter (PMF-BS) and be splitted into two identical
laser pulses that each will be finally transmitted to Alice and Bob for CV encoding. Meanwhile,
this PMF-BS will be reused in the CV BSM later. For simplicity, we name the two identical
laser pulses as the left and right pulse. Here, we take the optical transmission process of the left
pulse as an example. The left pulse goes out of the PMF-BS and into a PMF-PBS, due to its H
polarization, it transmits through the PMF-PBS. Through a long distance single mode optical
fiber, the left pulse goes into Alice’s port. All the modulators are not working at this moment.
The left pulse is then reflected by the FM, changing its polarization to vertical (V) polarization.
Once the left pulse is transmitted back to the PMF-PBS, due to the change of its polarization it
is reflected this time and going to the right branch of this set. Then it meets another PMF-PBS
and again reflected. The left pulse is transmitted to Bob’s port through another long distance
single mode optical fiber, then it is reflected by FM. Once reflected, the polarization is restored
back to H, and Bob prepares his CV Gaussian-modulated quantum states. The modulated left
pulse goes back to the PMF-PBS, due to its H polarization, it transmits through the PMF-PBS
and back to the balanced PMF-BS of untrusted relay for CV BSM. As for the right pulse, the
process is quite similar, except that the modulation process takes place at Alice’s port. The CV
quantum states prepared by Alice and Bob will stably interfere due to the two identical laser
pulses go through the same optical path. In another word, the phase-reference is self-aligned.
By the way, a pi/2 phase modulation to the encoded pulse back from Bob’s port is added for CV
Bell detection purpose 49. For simplified, the additional pi/2 phase can be directly implemented
in Bob’s quantum states preparation stage. It’s worth noting that the idea of our new optical
scheme about self-aligned phase-reference can also be used in free space and satellite-based
CV-MDI-QKD 59–62, especially for geostationary satellite 63.
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Figure 2: Schematic structure of the self-aligned CV-MDI-QKD protocol. PBS, polarization
beam splitter; OC, optical circulator; BS, 50:50 beam splitter; AM, amplitude modulator; PM,
phase modulator; FM, Farady mirror; D1, D2, detector; DAQ, data acquisition.
The secure key rate and simulation result. The security of general CV-MDI-QKD protocol
has been analyzed under two kinds of quantum attack. One is using two independent entangle-
ment cloners 50, 51, each attacking the channel between the relay and Alice or Bob independently.
This kind of attack just extends the one-channel entanglement cloner attack in CV-QKD proto-
col to two channels independently. The other kind of attack is more general 49, two ancillary
modes from a reservoir of ancillas each attacks one of the two channels. These two ancillary
modes may be correlated, which means the first kind of attack is nothing but a special condition
of the second kind of attack. It has been proven that the most effective attack is when the two
ancillary modes are entangled 49, and this is also the most powerful attack of Eve can launch in
the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
Here, we follow the security analysis in Ref. 49. For general two channel attack, the two
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Gaussian ancillas can be described by the following covariance matrix 49
σE1E2 =

 ωAI G
G ωBI

 , (1)
with I =

 1 0
0 1

 andG =

 g 0
0 g′

. Where ωA and ωB are the eigen-frequencies of these
two ancillas, whileG stands for the correlation between two ancillary modes with corresponding
parameters g and g′.
Here we assume that Alice’s raw key is the reference. For simplify, we ignore the Trojan-
horse attack in the quantum states preparation. The Trojan-horse attack of untrusted source in
plug-and-play structure will be discussed in discussion section later. With the ideal Gaussian
modulation variance ϕ≫ 1, the secure key rate of CV-MDI-QKD protocolR can be given by 49
R = ξIAB − IEA,
IAB = log2
µ
χ
,
IEA = h
( √
λλ′
|τA − τB|
)
+ log2
e|τA − τB|µ
2(τA + τB)
− h(ν),
(2)
with IAB representing the mutual information between Alice and Bob, while IEA being Eve’s
information about the raw key of Alice. ξ ≤ 1 stands for the reconciliation efficiency, χ is the
equivalent noise, τA and τB are Alice’s and Bob’s transmissivities, respectively. The h-function
is defined as h(x) = x+1
2
log2
x+1
2
−x−1
2
log2
x−1
2
and µ = ϕ+1. Some intermediate variables are
introduced to simplify the above equations, their definitions are 49 ν =
√
(τA + λ)(τA + λ′)/τB ,
λ = κ−ug, and λ′ = κ+ug′, with κ = (1−τA)ωA+(1−τB)ωB, and u = 2
√
(1− τA)(1− τB).
In the proof-of-principle CV-MDI-QKD experiment 49, the modulation variance ϕ = 60 has
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been achieved, so the ideal modulation assumption is a good approximation. As for reconcil-
iation efficiency ξ = 0.97 can be achieved 38, which is very close to 1. The difference seems
minor but has a major impact on the rate, improving ξ is a major task in nowadays CV-QKD
research. When the transmission efficiency τA = τB = τ , i.e., the symmetric condition, the
secure key rate of CV-MDI-QKD under the realistic condition can be given by
R = log2
8τµξ−1
e2χξ
√
λλ′
+ h(ν1), (3)
with ν1 =
√
(τ + λ)(τ + λ′)/τ . When the transmission efficiency τA 6= τB , i.e., the asymmet-
ric condition, the secure key rate of CV-MDI-QKD under the realistic condition can be given
by
R = log2
2(τA + τB)µ
ξ−1
e|τA − τB|χξ + h(ν)− h
( √
λλ′
|τA − τB|
)
. (4)
Follow the discussion in Ref. 49, two situations need to be considered: one is that Alice
and Bob know the transmissivities (τA and τB) and the thermal noise affecting each link (ωA
and ωB). Then they must calculate the lower bound of the key rate for various g and g
′. To
determine Eve’s best strategy and give a lower bound of the key rate is of central importance in
any QKD protocol 1–3, since overestimate of the rate will harm the security of the final key. The
minimized key rate of Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) in this situation can be written as
R(τ, ωA, ωB) =h
(
τ + λopt
τ
)
+ log2
8τµξ−1
e2χξoptλopt
, (5)
and
R(τA, τB, ωA, ωB) =h
(
τA + λopt
τB
)
− h
(
λopt
|τA − τB|
)
+ log2
2(τAτB)
ξµξ−1
e|τA − τB|(τA + τB + λopt)ξ ,
(6)
respectively, with λopt = κ + u|g|max and χopt = 2(2τ + λopt)/τ . The two expressions can
be obtained by using the following two steps. First, by using the condition g = −g′, one can
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minimize the key rate. Second, by using the condition g = |g|max, we can further minimize the
key rate.
The second situation is that Alice and Bob know the transmissivities and the equivalent
noise (χ). Actually, this is a more realistic situation since these parameters can be determined
through data comparison in the classical post-process of the QKD protocol 49. So the expression
of the minimized key rate in symmetric condition is
R(τ, χ) =h
(
χ− 2
2
)
+ log2
16µξ−1
e2χξ(χ− 4) , (7)
and in asymmetric condition is
R(τA, τB, χ) = log2
2(τA + τB)µ
ξ−1
e|τA − τB|χξ + h
(
τAχ
τA + τB
− 1
)
− h
[
τAτBχ− (τA + τB)2
|τA − τB|(τA + τB)
]
,
(8)
with χ = 2(τA + τB)/τAτB + ε, and ε is the excess noise. The above two expressions can be
achieved when g = −g′. So in the above two situations (thermal noise and equivalent noise),
the condition g = −g′ can always minimize the key rate. Based on Eq. (8) and the experiment
parameters of Ref. 49, the secure key rate of CV-MDI-QKD for various transmissivities τA and
τB is shown in Fig. 3. We can see the secure key rate is smaller when the untrusted relay is
closer to the center between Alice and Bob. The ideal situation is that the untrusted relay is
very close to Alice or even the CV BSM is performed by Alice. Once Bob’s raw key is used as
the reference, the conclusion is opposite due to the symmetry of CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
We remark that Eq. (3) to (8) are a natural generalization of the secure key rate formulas
given in Ref. 49 from ξ = 1 to a more general condition with ξ ≤ 1. Here, we assume the
condition that minimize the rate when ξ = 1 also holds for ξ < 1. In the next section, we will
rigourously prove this assumption and shows the above generalization is valid.
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Figure 3: The secure key rate of CV-MDI-QKD varies with the transmissivities τA and τB .
Here, we use the parameters ξ = 0.97, ϕ = 60 and ε = 0.01 for simulation. The unit of the
secret key rate is bits per relay use.
Discussion
In this paper, a new optical kind of CV-MDI-QKD scheme has been proposed. Through del-
icately manipulating the polarization, two laser pulses quantum states transmitted through the
same fibers before CV BSM in the relay, thus their relative phase fluctuation is negligible and
the phase-reference is self-aligned without introducing any complicated technologies. Further-
more, we give an alternate proof of the minimized key rate condition to generate the secure key
rate. We hope that our work can help the experimental study of the CV-MDI-QKD. One should
note that the remote distance phase-locking technology may be achieved by the development of
frequency combs or atom-clock synchronization.
We should point out that there are still some drawbacks in our scheme. Like all plug-
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and-play type QKD systems 56, there exists untrusted source problem in our scheme 64, 65. The
most well-known threat for an untrusted source QKD protocol is the Trojan-horse attack 66, 67.
Recently, a work shows Trojan-horse attack will greatly decrease the key rate along with the
increasing of the mean photon number of the Trojan-horse mode 68. The practical security
bound against the Trojan-horse attack in DV-QKD has been shown 67. The security of collective
attack in plug-and-play CV-QKD system has also been given 69. The wavelength filter and the
intensity monitoring detector are the most suitable countermeasures for the Trojan-horse-type
attack 64, 65, 67, 69. Note that these countermeasures will inevitably reduce the key rate. However,
the unconditional security proof of CV-QKD with untrusted source is still an important open
problem for future study. Similar with the plug-and-play QKD system 56, another drawback
of our scheme is the strong Rayleigh scattering, which will effect the coherent detection at
Charlie. This drawback has been studied in the work of the plug-and-play CV-QKD 69. Several
methods have been presented to solve this problem, such as using a wideband shot-noise-limited
homodyne detector and preparing optical pulses with a narrow full width at half maximum 69.
At last, the repetition rate is limited in the plug-and-play QKD system.
Surprisingly, one could use the new scheme to build a CV-MDI-QKD network with a
single untrusted source by further security analysis, which is similar with the DV-MDI-QKD
network with an untrusted source 65. Recently, the composable security against coherent attacks
of CV-MDI-QKD has been proven 70.
Methods
The detailed proof of the minimized key rate condition. Due to the fact that R is the same
under the transformation g ←→ −g′, R is symmetric with respect to the bisector g = −g′ 49. It
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should to be noticed that the minimized key rate condition g = −g′ has been proven and used
in Ref. 49. Here, we give an alternate proof of the minimized key rate condition by using the
differential method. Our proof is quite straightforward. Under different situations, the key rate
is a monotonic increasing function with the corresponding variable through the positivity of its
first derivative. Then the minimum of R is achieved once the variable reaches its minimum.
Consider any accessible point (g0, g
′
0), the distance between this point and bisector g =
−g′ is d and (l,−l) is the projection point of (g0, g′0) on bisector g = −g′. With simple cal-
culation, we have d = |g0 + g′0|/
√
2 and l = (g0 − g′0)/2. Due to the symmetry, we only
need to consider the sector g0 + g
′
0 ≥ 0, which leads to g0 = d′ + l and g′0 = d′ − l with
d = (g0 + g
′
0)/
√
2 and d′ =
√
2d/2. Therefore, we have obtained the parameter transformation
from {g, g′} to {d′, l}.
Once ωA and ωB are fixed (κ is fixed), we let λ = κ − u(d′ + l), λ′ = κ + u(d′ − l), we
have λ + λ′ = 2δ and λλ′ = δ2 − u2d′2 with δ = κ − ul > 0. The minimization procedure
should be considered over two parameters d′ and l. Once χ = β
α
√
(β + λ)(β + λ′) is fixed,
the analytical expression of δ can be given by δ =
√
α2χ2/β2 + u2d′2 − β with α = τAτB
and β = τA + τB . Meanwhile, we have λ + λ
′ = 2
(√
α2χ2/β2 + u2d′2 − β
)
and λλ′ =
α2χ2/β2 + β2 − 2β
√
α2χ2/β2 + u2d′2. So if χ is fixed, we only need to minimize the key rate
over the parameter d′.
Here we show an alternate proof that g = −g′ minimize the key rate whenever the thermal
noise or the equivalent noise is fixed for symmetric condition with τA = τB . First, we consider
the case of the fixed thermal noise. Under the symmetric condition, the expression of the key
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rate in Eq. (3) can be written as
R(y) = h(ν1)− log2 ν2 − log2 ν3 + log2
8
e2
, (9)
where ν1 =
√
(τ + δ)2 − y/τ , ν2 = µ1−ξ
(
2
√
(2τ + δ)2 − y/τ
)ξ
and ν3 =
√
δ2 − y/τ with
y = u2d′2 and 0 ≤ y ≤ δ2. Obviously, ν3 < ν1.
Next, we prove that R(y) is monotonic increase function, so it reaches its minimum once
y = 0. The first derivative of R′(y) is
R′(y) =
1
2τ 2
(
log2 e
ν23
− 1
2ν1
g(ν1)
)
− (log2 ν2)′ >
F (y)
2ν3τ 2
− (log2 ν2)′, (10)
with g(x) = log2
x+1
x−1
, F (y) = log2 e
ν3
− 1
2
g(ν1) and F
′(y) = log2 e
2τ2
[
1
ν3
3
− 1
ν1(ν21−1)
]
. It’s easy to
verify that g′(x) < 0 and (log2 ν2)
′ < 0. Due to the fact that ν21 − ν23 = (τ+δ)
2−δ2
τ2
= τ
2+2τδ
τ2
> 1,
we get ν21 − 1 > ν23 , which leads to F ′(y) > 0 and F (y) ≥ L(0). Since F (0) = F (0, δ) =
τ log2 e
δ
− 1
2
log2
2τ+δ
δ
, F ′(0, δ) = −τ log2 e
[
1
δ2
− 1
δ(δ+2τ)
]
< 0 and together with the fact that
F (0, δ → +∞) → 0, we have F (y) ≥ F (0, δ) > 0. Then R′(y) > 0, so R(y) reaches its
minimum when y = 0, which means d′ = 0, i.e., g = −g′.
The second situation is that the equivalent noise χ is fixed. Under this situation, the key
rate of Eq. (6) is simplified under the symmetric condition as
R = h(ν1)− log2 ν2 + log2
8µξ−1
χξe2
, (11)
where ν1 =
√
(τ + λ)(τ + λ′)/τ =
√
b1 − a1y, and ν2 =
√
λλ′/τ =
√
b2 − a2y, with y =√
τ 2χ2/4 + u2d′2, b1 =
χ2
4
+ 1, a1 =
2
τ
, b2 =
χ2
4
+ 4 and a2 =
4
τ
. It is easy to check that
ν1 > ν2.
Next, we prove that R(y) is a monotonic increasing function. The first derivative of R(y)
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is
R′(y) =
a2 log2 e
2ν22
− a1
4ν1
g(ν1) >
L(y)
2ν1
, (12)
with L(y) = a2 log2 e
ν2
− a1
2
g(ν1) and L
′(y) =
[
a2
2
2ν3
2
− a21
2ν1(ν21−1)
]
log2 e. Due to χ ≥ β2/α = 4,
one has υ21 − υ22 = (a2 − a1)y − (b2 − b1) = 2τ y − 3 ≥ 2τ τχ2 − 3 = χ− 3 ≥ 1. So ν21 − 1 ≥ ν22
and along with the fact that a2 > a1, we have L
′(y) > 0 which further indicates L(y) ≥ L( τχ
2
).
L′( τχ
2
) = −4 log2 e
τ
[
1
(χ−4)2
− 1
χ(χ−4)
]
< 0 with χ being a variable, together with the fact that
L( τχ
2
) → 0 when χ → +∞, we have L( τχ
2
) > 0. Finally, R′(y) > L(y)/2ν1 ≥ L( τχ2 )/2ν1 >
0. So R(y) is a monotonic increasing function with its minimum obtained once y reaches its
minimum. Due to the fact that y reaches its minimum when d′ = 0, then g = −g′ minimize the
key rate under the symmetric condition.
In the above discussion, we have provided an alternate proof that g = −g′ is Eve’s best
strategy in the symmetric condition no matter with the fixed thermal noise or equivalent noise.
Next we analyze the general condition with τA 6= τB .
We first consider the situation with fixed equivalent noise. The key rate of Eq. (8) can be
expressed as
R = h(ν1)− h(ν2) + log2
2(τA + τB)µ
ξ−1
e|τA − τB|χξ ,
(13)
where ν1 =
√
b1 − a1y and ν2 =
√
b2 − a2y with y =
√
u2d′2 + α2χ2/β2, b1 = 1 + τ
2
Aχ
2/β2,
a1 =
2
τB
, b2 = (β
2 + α2χ2/β2)/(β2 − 4α) and a2 = 2β/(β2 − 4α). The domain of definition
for variable y is [ymin, ymax] = [αχ/β, (α
2χ2/β2 + β2)/2β].
Next, we prove that R(y) is a monotonic increasing function with y. Then its minimum
can be achieved once y reaches its minimum (d′ = 0 or equivalently g = −g′ ). The first
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derivative of R(y) is
R′(y) =
a2
4ν2
g(ν2)− a1
4ν1
g(ν1). (14)
Introducing the variable transformations q(y) = ν1+ν2
2
and p(y) = ν1−ν2
2
, rewrite the expression
of R′(y) as
R′(y) =
p′(y)
2
[g(ν1) + g(ν2)] +
q′(y)
2
[g(ν1)− g(ν2)] , (15)
with p′(y) = a2ν1−a1ν2
4ν1ν2
and q′(y) = −a2ν1+a1ν2
4ν1ν2
< 0. The relationship between ν1 and ν2 can be
summarized as
ν1 > ν2 (τA ≥ 2τB),
ν1 < ν2 (τA < 2τB).
(16)
While there is an extra restriction for χ when ν1 < ν2
χ ≥ 2τBβ
τA(2τB − τA) (τB < τA ≤ 2τB),
χ ≥ 2β
τA
(τA < τB),
(17)
otherwise ν1 > ν2. Meanwhile, p
′(y) > 0 holds for any value of the parameters. For ν1 > ν2,
since g(x) is a monotonically decreasing function, we have g(ν1) < g(ν2). Alongside with the
fact that q′ < 0 and p′ > 0, it’s easy to see that R′(y) > 0.
The remaining problem is to prove R′(y) > 0 also holds for ν1 < ν2. Introducing a new
function D(y) = d(ν1) − d(ν2) with d(x) = (x − 1)g(x). The first and second derivatives
of d(x) are d′(x) = g(x) − 2 log2 e
x+1
, and d′′(x) = 2 log2 e
x+1
( 1
x+1
− 1
x−1
) < 0, respectively. Since
d′(x) → 0 (x → +∞), we have d′(x) > 0. So d(x) is a monotonically increasing function.
Due to the fact that ν1 < ν2, i.e., D(y) < 0, the following inequation holds
g(ν1)
g(ν2)
< ν2−1
ν1−1
. Thus,
we have
R′(y) =
a2
4ν2
g(ν2)− a1
4ν1
g(ν1) >
a1
4ν2
g(ν2)
A(y)
a1ν1(ν1 − 1) ,
(18)
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whereA(y) = (a2ν
2
1−a1ν22)−(a2ν1−a1ν2) = (a2ν21−a1ν22)−k(y) ≥ (a2ν21−a1ν22)−k(ymin)
with k(y) = a2ν1 − a1ν2. Here we use the fact that k(y) ≤ k(ymin) when ν1 < ν2 . For
τB < τA ≤ 2τB,
k(ymin) =
4τAτBχ
(τA + τB)(τA − τB)2 −
2(τA + τB)(2τB − τA)
τB(τA − τB)2 ,
(19)
which leads to
A(y) ≥ 2τ
3
A [χ
2 − 2τB(τA + τB)χ/τ 2A]
(τ 2A − τ 2B)2
− 2(τA + τB)
τB(τA − τB) .
(20)
Due to χ ≥ 2τB(τA+τB)
τA(2τB−τA)
> τB(τA+τB)
τ2
A
, we have A(y) ≥ 4τ2A(3τB−τA)
τB(τA−τB)(2τB−τA)2
> 0, thus R′(y) > 0.
For τA < τB ,
k(ymin) =
4τ 2Aχ
(τA + τB)(τA − τB)2 −
2τA(τA + τB)
τB(τA − τB)2 ,
(21)
which leads to
A(y) ≥ 2τ
3
AτB [χ
2 − 2(τA + τB)χ/τA]
τB(τ
2
A − τ 2B)2
. (22)
Due to χ ≥ 2(τA+τB)
τA
> τA+τB
τA
, we have A(y) ≥ 0, thus R′(y) > 0. Therefore, R′(y) > 0
is a general result independent of the values of parameters. In conclusion, g = −g′ always
minimized the key rate when χ is fixed. As for the condition with thermal noise ωA and ωB
fixed, we can follow the above procedures to prove g = −g′ minimize the rate. For simplicity,
we will not show the detailed calculations here. Follow the above discussion, in this situation
the rate can be further minimized when λ = λopt, we also prove this conclusion.
The relationship between ν1 and ν2. Now we compare ν1 and ν2 through determining the sign
of function
ν1 − ν2 = (b1 − b2)− (a1 − a2)y
υ1 + υ2
=
a1 − a2
υ1 + ν2
(y0 − y) , (23)
with y0 =
b1−b2
a1−a2
. The above equation holds when a1 6= a2.
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For a1 = a2 (τA = 3τB), ν1 − ν2 = b1−b2υ1+υ2 . Based on the fact that χ >
2β
τA
, it’s easy to
verify b1 > b2 and ν1 > ν2.
For a1 < a2 (τA < 3τB),y ≥ y0 means ν1 ≥ ν2 and y < y0 means ν1 < ν2. Then,
ymax − y0 > 0, here we use the fact that χ ≥ β2/α. If 3τB > τA > 2τB , and based on the fact
that τAχ
β
> β
τB
> 2, we have ymin > y0 which means ν1 > ν2. If τA < 2τB , ymin ≤ y0 holds
only if χ ≥ β(3τB−τA+|τA−τB |)
τA(2τB−τA)
. For τB < τA < 2τB , we have χ ≥ 2τBβτA(2τB−τA) . For τA < τB , we
have χ ≥ 2β
τA
. So with the proper value of χ , ν1 ≤ ν2 can be reached when τA < 2τB.
For a1 > a2 (τA > 3τB), y ≤ y0 leads to ν1 ≥ ν2 while y > y0 leads to ν1 < ν2.
Following the same procedure, ymax − y0 < 0, so we have ν1 > ν2. In a word, once τA ≥ 2τB ,
we have ν1 > ν2.
The Proof of p′(y) > 0. The expression of p′(y) is p′(y) = a2ν1−a1ν2
4ν1ν2
. Here we introduce a new
function k(y) = a2ν1 − a1ν2, k′(y) = a1a22 ( 1ν2 − 1ν1 ).
For τA ≥ 2τB , we have ν1 > ν2. Then k′(y) > 0, so k(y) ≥ k(ymin) > 0, we have p′(y) >
0. Next, we consider the condition τA < 2τB . Based on Eq. (17), once χ <
β(3τB−τA+|τA−τB |)
τA(2τB−τA)
,
ν1 > ν2 so we get p
′(y) > 0. Once χ ≥ β(3τB−τA+|τA−τB |)
τA(2τB−τA)
, ymin ≤ y0 < ymax. The region of y
can be divided into three parts
ymin < y < y0, k
′(y) < 0 (ν1 < υ2),
y = y0, k
′(y) = 0 (ν1 = ν2 = ν),
y0 < y < ymax, k
′(y) > 0 (ν1 > ν2).
(24)
It’s easy to see that k(y) reaches its minimum when ν1 = ν2, so k(y) = a2ν1 − a1ν2 ≥
(a2 − a1)ν > 0, we have p′(y) > 0. Therefore, p′(y) > 0 is always satisfied independent of the
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values of parameters.
Minimization over λ. Once the thermal noise is fixed, the minimization is actually a two-step
procedure. We have already proved g = −g′ minimize the key rate, next is to prove λ = λopt
further minimize the key rate. The key rate can be divided into the following two parts
R = H(τA, τB, λ) + L(τA, τB, λ), (25)
withH(τA, τB, λ) = h(
τA+λ
τB
)− h( λ
|τA−τB |
), and L(τA, τB, λ) = log2
2(τAτB)
ξµξ−1
e|τA−τB |(τA+τB+λ)ξ
.
It is easy to see that L(τA, τB, λ) is minimized when maximizing λ, so the remaining part
is to prove that H(τA, τB, λ) is also minimized under this same condition. To find the mini-
mum of H(τA, τB, λ), we give its first and second derivatives H
′(τA, τB, λ) =
1
2τB
g( τA+λ
τB
) −
1
2|τA−τB|
g( λ
|τA−τB |
), and H
′′
(τA, τB, λ) =
1
λ2−|τA−τB |2
− 1
(λ+τA)2−τB2
, respectively. Then the sign
of H
′′
(τA, τB, λ) is determined by the sign of the following term (λ
2 − |τA − τB|2) − [(λ +
τA)
2 − τB2] = −2τA(λ + τA − τB) ≤ −2τA(λ − |τA − τB|) < 0. Here, we use the fact that
λ > |τA−τB|. If λ satisfies λ ≤ |τA−τB |, a clear consequence is that λ|τA−τB | ≤ 1 is existing. So
h( λ
|τA−τB |
) will give complex value which is certainly non-physical. So to overcome this prob-
lem, we have to set λ > |τA−τB|, and this further confirms τA+λτB > 1 to make the term h(
τA+λ
τB
)
physical. So H
′′
(τA, τB, λ) > 0, makes H
′(τA, τB, λ) monotonically increasing in the region.
For λ → +∞, H ′(τA, τB, λ) → 0, combined with the fact that it increases monotonically, we
obtainH ′(τA, τB, λ) < 0. SoH(τA, τB, λ)monotonically decreases in the region, and it reaches
its minimum when maximizing λ, which equals λopt = λ + u|g|max. Based on the deduction
above, we prove that R reaches its minimum when λ reaches its maximum. For simplicity, we
only give the proof for asymmetric condition above. It’s easy to prove the conclusion also holds
for the symmetric condition.
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